Yes, what I found excellent about this explanation is how the system is actually dynamic, but NASA treated it as static.
In the reference good design, the single O-Rings must dynamically seat against the outermost surface from the forces in the initial leak test, and that seating is reinforced by the actual flight pressures. This also relies upon the free path of hot gasses from the hot pressurized combustion side to apply equal pressure around the ring and compress the now-hot air against the ring and steel walls, which act as a heat sink, and achieve 1/1-million failure rates.
In contrast, it looks like NASA treated it as a static system, just adding more "sealant" and O-Rings to the system, which actually forked-up the dynamics, forcing a single-point breakthru of the O-ring. And worse yet, they magnified the problem in the "fix", and the only reason it didn't happen again is they never launched in such cold temps again.
Also particularly sad to see the failure obvious in Pic #4, with hot gasses expelling from the SRB side even before it leaves the pad. They were already doomed. And even if someone somehow saw that failure happening on the pad, could anything have been done? A way to separate them from the main structure early and abort? Separate the shuttle from the main tank and abort?
In the reference good design, the single O-Rings must dynamically seat against the outermost surface from the forces in the initial leak test, and that seating is reinforced by the actual flight pressures. This also relies upon the free path of hot gasses from the hot pressurized combustion side to apply equal pressure around the ring and compress the now-hot air against the ring and steel walls, which act as a heat sink, and achieve 1/1-million failure rates.
In contrast, it looks like NASA treated it as a static system, just adding more "sealant" and O-Rings to the system, which actually forked-up the dynamics, forcing a single-point breakthru of the O-ring. And worse yet, they magnified the problem in the "fix", and the only reason it didn't happen again is they never launched in such cold temps again.
Also particularly sad to see the failure obvious in Pic #4, with hot gasses expelling from the SRB side even before it leaves the pad. They were already doomed. And even if someone somehow saw that failure happening on the pad, could anything have been done? A way to separate them from the main structure early and abort? Separate the shuttle from the main tank and abort?