> What allowed WW1 to happen, among a lot of other reasons, was Wilhelm II's dismanzling of Bismarks alliances and treaties.
That's a commonly held view, but Bismark is partly responsible for the inability of Germany to win WW1. He was the one that set up pre-WW1's alliances, and especially, he was the one that alienated Russia with duplicitous diplomacy. That policy, which culminated at the Berlin conference is, ultimately, the thing that allowed France to break from its diplomatic isolation.
On the contrary, it was Bismark's successor who wrecked the private non-aggression deal between Russia and Germany by initially agreeing to its continuation and then suddenly pulling out. Bismark succeeded in diplomatically isolating France, his successors succeeded in uniting France first with Russia and then with the UK.
Robert Massie's book "Dreadnought" does a thorough and impressive job of explaining the long background to the tragedy of WW1.
> it was Bismark's successor who wrecked the private non-aggression deal between Russia and Germany by initially agreeing to its continuation and then suddenly pulling out.
They pulled out because it was doomed. Germany had to choose between Russia and A-H, and that choice was made well before Bismarck's retirement, at least since the Berlin conference.
From that point, the Russian-German alliance was a walking-dead. There are russian sources citing frustration and depreciating the alliance before Germany formally broke it.
Bismarck, and that is my take, was one of the few people as it turned out, that understood fully well that Germany / Prussia was in no position to ever win a two front war in Europe. He also seems to have understood that fast, quick wars, like the war of 1870, was the only kind of war Germany could win. And that those wars were a thing of the past. hence his well balanced system of treaties, including secret ones, to reduce the likelihood of that happening.
And France getting out of isolation was actually a good thing, or at least not a bad one. Or was France, after 1870, on the attacking side of any war? It wasn't. it wasn't even involved in a lot of wars not forced upon it by others until the futile attempts to hold on to the colonies post WW2.
And no, Bismarck did not set-up the pre-WW1 alliances, the alliances in place leading up to WW2 were not designed by Bismarck. Those alliances were the result of Wilhelm 2's actions in dissolving the rather ambiguous Bismarck system, which led to the building of the Prusso-German-Austrian block on one side and the British-French-Russian one on the other. Exactly what Bismarck wanted to avoid, and did as long as he had a say.
EDIT: Prussia, and Germany general, was only able to win quick wars. Everything else required allies, and that fact was already by Frederick the Great and driven home clearly by the Napoleonic wars. The reasons are, in a nutshell, the fact any prolonged war will inevitably be a two front one. That Prussia didn't have the necessary resources for a prolonged war. And that without secured access to the sea, any colonies Prussia / Germany had were basically useless. And that access was a non-started as soon as the Royal navy, or even the French one later, got involved. So in the end, either Prussia / Germany won quick and decisively, or it was outgunned, outnumbered and outresourced on two fronts. Bismarck had nothing to do with that, that is caused by geography.
And history showed us the Germany was well able to win on one front: The Eastern one in WW1 and the Western one, initially, in WW2. Throw in a second one, and the war is lost. Or rather not winning quickly on the second one, and the war is lost (as shown by Barbarossa's failure to defeat the USSR at Moscow, and even then it is doubtful the USSR would just have rolled over). Funny side effect of that: the German armed forces, and as an extent, but to a lesser degree, German industry suck at logistics and supply chain management to this very day.
> that understood fully well that Germany / Prussia was in no position to ever win a two front war
Here is the thing. Germany was in position to win a 2 front war by 1914. We take the word of German generals (who made lots of mistakes) for granted.
What they could win is a war where Britain and US invested massive resources against them.
The reality was that the French army was utterly ineffective on offense until 1918 and lost way more men then Germany in offensives. So the French army could certainty have been contained on the German border even with a 1:1 force commitment (or less). And the French could certainty not push threw Belgium the way the Germans did as that would ruin their relationship with Britian. The Franco-German border would have been hell to attack.
And Russia after 1905 was clearly very weak politically. The were massive issues with nationalities and peasant-landlord relations that could be exploited.
If Germany had a limited objective of splitting Finland, Baltics and Poland away from Russia (and Western Ukraine if all goes) it would have been a very different war.
German can make good propaganda about Russians being the aggressor and flood British/US newspapers with Russian soldiers burning East Prussian homes (and worse) and then counter-attack.
Thanks to overwhelming artillery (and shell) production they can push threw the Russian as quickly as logistic allows (not very quickly). Remember, Russia had basically no domestic shell production in 1914. They were massively lucky the overwhelming effort was on France. Take look at what happened in 1916 when they actually focused on the Russians, artillery was overwhelming. This would have been far more the case in 1914.
They could have capture the major part of what they want, in 1914/1915 and then defend or focus on Ukraine.
How many millions of French would run head first against the defense before they would want to settle? What British poletican is gone say 'Germany is mainly fighting Russia but lets raise 5 million men to run against the German army so France can get back what it lost in 1870'.
And the propaganda writes itself, German army frees Jews, Pols, Lithuanians, Fins from Russian yoke. Something that would be massively popular in both Britain and US.
Germany and Austria assuming Britain and the US are neutralish would win against Russia and France. That what we really learn from WW1. Without British money neither France, Italy or Russia could have fought as long as they did in the first place.
Well, Germany one, initially one front each per world war. All it took for the stalemate in the West to settle in was the British being allied with the French, and then Germany couldn't realistically win in the West anymore.
But yeah, had the Germans played it smarter, things could have ended differently in 1914. Thing is, they didn't.
Also, the US played a much smaller role in WW1 than people think, Germany lost too early for the USmilitary and numbers to make much of a difference. Most, almost all, of the fighting by the Entente in West was done by the French and British.
> then Germany couldn't realistically win in the West anymore.
They don't need to win in the West. That's my point. Germany has no interest in the West. The only thing they care about is stopping the French from passing over the border.
> Thing is, they didn't.
My point was, the analysis that 'Germany couldn't win a 2 Front war' is wrong. Its central to German conception of strategy in that period and it was incorrect.
The overestimated both France and Russia in terms of their abilities.
> US played a much smaller role in WW1 than people think
Actually is played a much bigger role. Read Adam Tooze book 'The Deluge'. The US economy was essentially fully mobilized by Britain with the help of JP Morgan.
And once they joined they provided even more. That's why after WW1 the US was basically a financial super-power.
And the military reserves were very important, and influenced allied strategy.
There is some truth to it. In WW1, they had a lot to loose in the West and little to win. They tried anyway (maybe because to preempt any invasion from France, no idea...). In WW2, if it wasn't for ideological reason, they had little to win in the East.
I forgot who said it, but there truths to it: The Germans are tactically brilliant, operationally lacking and strategically bankcrupt. I am German, working in international environments, and I see parallels in industry.
That's a commonly held view, but Bismark is partly responsible for the inability of Germany to win WW1. He was the one that set up pre-WW1's alliances, and especially, he was the one that alienated Russia with duplicitous diplomacy. That policy, which culminated at the Berlin conference is, ultimately, the thing that allowed France to break from its diplomatic isolation.