First of all, I'm neither invested in ChainLink nor ETH. I'm interested in working on oracles.
Secondly, this is an informal discussion on a mainstream forum - one which is pretty strongly against crypto. So forgive me for not being super keen on writing PhD-level responses
The current white paper mentions that for a briber with at most `$d*(n^2 + n)/2`, where n is the number of oracle nodes, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium for bribers to not issue the bribe and nodes to behave honestly. I can't seem to find a formal proof though.
If you bother to check the listed examples in the white paper, my hand-wavey "trillions of dollars" estimate wouldn't be even that far off, assuming wider adoption of Chainlink.
Secondly, this is an informal discussion on a mainstream forum - one which is pretty strongly against crypto. So forgive me for not being super keen on writing PhD-level responses
The current white paper mentions that for a briber with at most `$d*(n^2 + n)/2`, where n is the number of oracle nodes, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium for bribers to not issue the bribe and nodes to behave honestly. I can't seem to find a formal proof though.
If you bother to check the listed examples in the white paper, my hand-wavey "trillions of dollars" estimate wouldn't be even that far off, assuming wider adoption of Chainlink.