Even if implicit TLS is used instead of STARTTLS, DANE is still necessary to avoid forcing backwards-compatible agents to fall back to unencrypted traditional communication.
DANE is necessary as long as there are still some agents using backwards-compatible behavior; i.e. falling back to unencrypted communication if TLS is in some way blocked.
Those agents should not be falling back to unencrypted anyway! The whole ecosystem just needs to get onboard with implicit TLS and deprecate the old agents. It's not acceptable to make the whole ecosystem dependent on two completely different security mechanisms. Every client/server in the world would have to support both indefinitely, which would be a totally unnecessary cost and complexity burden.
I mean, if we accept completely deprecating non-TLS connections, then there still would be no problem with STARTTLS! Servers would just need to only allow the STARTTLS command, and refuse any commands until after the TLS handshake. I believe that many server programs allows this configuration today.
It is only when we allow backwards compatibility that something is needed to differentiate to the clients whether the server is new enough to allow TLS or not.
DANE is necessary as long as there are still some agents using backwards-compatible behavior; i.e. falling back to unencrypted communication if TLS is in some way blocked.